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Rabu, 11 Mei 2022

Conflicts in Criminal Jurisdiction

 


The author view that the conflict of criminal jurisdiction arise because there are overlapping of offences provided in Penal Code and enactment of syariah criminal offences in the state. I agree with the statement made by the author because when there are 2 laws provide the similar offence, the confusion occurred which court has the jurisdiction to try that offence either syariah court or civil court. The federal government and the state government claim that they have jurisdiction on this matter. Here is the point of conflicting over the criminal matters arise. As an example, if the party who commit the offence is a muslim, the accused person should be prosecuted under which laws either Syariah Criminal Offences or Penal Code or other federal laws.

In fact there are many examples of provisions under syariah criminal offences that overlap with federal offences such as gambling which also provided under the Federal Gaming Tax Act 1972, giving false evidence which is also covered by section 191 of the Penal Code, abetment which overlaps with section 107 to 114 of the Penal Code and also liwat as discussed by the author in his article.

In my observation, although we have 2 kind of laws with regard to the same criminal offence, it is not contravene to our federal constitution. The state have the jurisdiction to create an offence against precept of Islam which is bind over the muslim only by virtue of item 1 of List II of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution whereas the federal also has the power to enact criminal law which is bind over the muslim and non muslim by virtue of item 4 of List I of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. I think both law can be enforced together. In fact this situation create a good phenomenon in our legal system because-

(1)     it wider the scope of prosecution whereby it will give a choice to the prosecutor either to prosecute the accused under the syariah criminal offences or Penal Code or other Federal laws. This practise in line with section 59 of the Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967 [Act 388] which states as follows:

“Where any act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more written laws, or under a written law and at common law, the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those laws or at common law, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”.

(2)     the accused person maybe sentenced with more severe sentence due to the limited jurisdiction. By virtue of Schedule Ninth, List II, Federal has enact the law named Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965 [Act 355] which limit the jurisdiction of syariah court. The Act provide jurisdiction of Syariah Courts as follows:

The Syariah Courts duly constituted under any law in a State and invested with jurisdiction over persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect of any of the matters enumerated in List II of the State List of the Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution are hereby conferred jurisdiction in respect of offences against precepts of the religion of Islam by persons professing that religion which may be prescribed under any written law:

Provided that such jurisdiction shall not be exercised in respect of any offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding three years or with any fine exceeding five thousand ringgit or with whipping exceeding six strokes or with any combination thereof.”.

The author in his writing put a case of Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja V. Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia & Anor High Court Malaya, Kuala Lumpur Abdul Wahab Patail J [Criminal Application No: 44-110-98] 7 November 1998 as an example of conflict in criminal matters.

I agree with the judgement given in the above case when the court decide that the syariah court does not have an exclusive jurisdiction over the liwat matter because instead of having the liwat provision in Syariah Criminal Offences Act/Enactment Penal code also provided the provision which has the same nature as liwat in section 377D. Because of this overlapping, the syariah court does not have the exclusive jurisdiction over the liwat matter so that the civil court has the jurisdiction to hear that case. Furthermore there is provision under Article 75 of the Federal Constitution which mention about the superiority of the federal laws over the state laws. The Article states as follows:

“If any State law is inconsistent with a federal law, the federal law shall prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”.

Having this article in our Federal Constitution, make it as  a strong arguement to try this case before the civil court not a syariah court because the Penal code as a federal law will prevail over the syariah criminal offences as a state law.

What is the solution?

In my observation based on the conflicts discussed above, I agree with the suggestion given by the author especially in promoting the harmonisation between civil and syariah law. I think it is the best approach to be done in our situation now.

Besides that the following things may be taken into consideration in order to solve the civil and criminal matters:

(1)          Islamisation of all the laws in Malaysia.

All the laws enacted in our country must be in line with hukum syarak because our Federal Constitution which is the Supreme law of the Federation has recognised Islam as the religion of Federation in article 3. Furthermore the Islamic law based on the revealation from Allah s.w.t and it is suitable with the nature of human being and can be practised at all times and towards all the people either muslim or non muslim. The Islamic law is complete and covers all aspect of lives. We should refer bck to our history whereby the Islamic law has been successfully practised the Islamic laws and malay custom as the laws of the states. Thats why in th case of Ramah v Laton, The Appeal Court in Selangor decided that Islamic law is the law of the land and the court should recognised and applied that laws.

In the book of Administration of Islamic laws also suggested that there should be a provision in the Federal Constitution to state that “Any law which is inconsistent with the Islamic law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”

If we manage to Islamise all the laws according to Islamic law and hukum syarak, the conflicts between civil court and syariah court may be avoided. I think the concept of Islamisation can be done in our civil laws because the application of Islamic civil law suitable to be applied to muslim and non muslim

(2)        Wider the interpretation of Islamic law

            The effort to wider the interpretation of Islamic law also maybe the good suggestion in order to resolve the conflict between civil and criminal law. As an example in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Pulau Pinang v. Isa Abdul Rahman [1992] 2MLJ 244, although the case fall within the ambit of Islamic matters, since there is no remedy for injunction provided in the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1959 (Penang), the Supreme Court held that the High Court had jurisdiction over the case.

In our observtion although there is no express provision about the remedy for injunction in the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1959 (Penang), since the subject mater involve is wakaf which is the Islamic matters as specified in item 1, schedule Ninth, List II of the Federal Constitution, then the syariah court should try that case. In Federal Constitution clearly state that wakaf under jurisdiction of syariah court, so although there is no express provision about the remedy for injunction in wakaf matter but as long as it relates to wakaf, we should wider the words wakaf to extend it application to all matters related to it includes injunction.

The effort to wider the interpretation of Islamic law has successfully been done in the case of Sulaiman Takrib V Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu; Kerajaan Malaysia (Intervener) And Other Cases [2009] 2CLJ 54, Federal Court  decide that 'Precepts of Islam' include 'law' or 'Shariah'. In order to interprete the word “precepts of Islam” 3 opinions of the 'experts' were take into account whereby the experts agree that precepts of Islam cover three main domains ie, creed or belief ('aqidah'), law ('shari'ah) and ethics or morality ('akhlak') and precepts of Islam are derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah.

 

 

 

 

THE RIGHT OF CONVERSION AND ITS EFFECT IN RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHTS

 

The freedom of religion is a universal human right and as mentioned by the writer s.18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) emphasizes the freedom to have adopt a religion or belief and to change one’s religion without restriction. But we have to bear in mind that all most of the International Instrument such as declaration, Convention, optional Protocols were drafted not in accordance with Islamic law or law of the country. That’s why we have to be careful before accepting whatever form of International instrument. Sometimes some of the Islamic country accept the instrument but make a reservation to the Article which is incontravene with Hukum Syarak. As an example, Malaysia has rectify the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) but we reserved the enforcement of Article 14 which states as follows:

“1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. “.

With regard to the UDHR, it started become an issue with adoption of this Declaration in 1948. The objectives of the UDHR do not create 'hard law' obligations on the Malaysian judiciary to adopt the International Instruments in interpreting the provisions on fundamental liberties. Adoption of the rights listed under the International Human Rights Instruments depends significantly upon the legislative implementation in the country. Unlike some constitutions in other jurisdictions, the Malaysian Federal Constitution does not impose on the national court to take cognisance of the International Human Rights laws in any of its provision. In other words, the international law on human rights are not law of the country and the Malaysian judiciary should not assume the parliament's power to make law.[1]

 

In the same breath, the European Court of Human Rights in Otto-Preminger-Institut's Case decided that it was up to the individual states to adopt and to any limitations to freedom of expression on the grounds legitimately prescribed by the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. The decision gives the implication that the individual states may interpret the rights under the international document according to the strategies to achieve basic human rights in their communities which lie at the core of their own social or moral values. [2]

 

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that section 2 of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999 ('SUHAKAM Act') provides that, 'human rights' refers to 'fundamental liberties as enshrined in Part II of the Federal Constitution'. Because of that reason, the argument to apply international instruments, such as the UDHR in defining the right to freedom of religion in Malaysia has no strong basis for a simple reason that the documents are not binding on the country.[3]

 

It is notable that the right to change religion under art. 18 of the UDHR was controversial and Saudi Arabia refused to ractify the Declaration as the Kingdom disagreed on the provision because its contradiction to the teaching of Islam. Probably that was the reason why the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ('ICCPR') does not explicitly provide for the right to change religion, though it

prescribes the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion that includes the right to adopt a religion or belief.[4]

 

In our country, right to freedom of religious is clearly provided under article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution. But the right to convert out from the religion which was professed since our birth, has no clear provision on it. In my opinion by inserting a provision in a state enactment about the power of the Syariah High Court in its civil jurisdiction to make a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim or to make a declaration that a deceased person was a Muslim or otherwise at the time of his death.indirectly could be interpreted that such act is allowable and there is a method to convert out from Islam provided in the Act/Enactments. However, the Act/Enactment not differentiate between the convert out cases involving muallaf or Muslim by birth. I think the method should be different because as a Muslim by birth we have no right to convert out. It is also in line with our federal Constitution Art 160 which states as follows:

 

“"Malay" means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and—

(a)      was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or

 

(b)      is the issue of such a person;”.

 

In the case of Daud bin Mamat,[5] Kamariah bte Ali[6], Lina Joy[7], the most controversial issue on the right to freedom of religion is the right of a Muslim to change his religion or the Muslims' right to renounce Islam. The courts in Malaysia thus far, directly or indirectly, are incline to the view that art. 11 does not include the right to change religion. This position is obvious in the decisions of and . In the High Court decided that the Kelantenese descents of Malay parentage have no right to renounce Islam. And freedom to 'profess' a religion under art 11(1) does not include the right to leave Islam as leaving Islam is 'exiting from a religion is certainly not a religion or could be equated with the right 'to profess and practise' their religion'. In , the Court of Appeal decided that the word 'profess' under art 11 should not be widely interpreted as to give to every person the right to leave Islam. The court said that if such interpretation is given to the word 'profess', it would also be applicable to the word 'practise' since both rights are used in the same phrase. If the interpretation is so, it would have a far-reaching effect that all religious law will be invalidated. This could not happen to Islam and Islamic law as the Constitution sanctions the position of Islam and Islamic criminal law. In there are at least two important aspects that have been dealt with by the court in relation to the Malay Muslims' right to freedom of religion. The High Court decided that a Malay Muslim cannot change his religious status. According to the court, being a Malay, one shall always be a Muslim. This is because the Constitution defines 'Malay' as a person, who, among others, professes the religion of Islam. Another issue that has been laid down by the High Court is the recognition to Islam as the religion of the Federation. It was decided that, in determining the scope of Muslims' right to religious freedom, the court must take into consideration the special position of Islam. Thus, respect must be given to Islamic religious institutions such as the Syariah courts and other religious bodies.

 

In all these cases the civil courts have excluded themselves from deciding on the Muslims right to leave Islam. The courts decided that the Syariah court is the proper forum to determine a Muslims' religious status. By implication, it can be said that, in deciding whether a Muslim can change his religion or not, it is left to the Syariah courts to decide, in which, Islamic law will surely be applied. Thus, the position is rather clear, a Muslim shall not be allowed renounce Islam without being referred to Syariah courts or religious authorities.[8]

 

Besides that, having read through Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution, it appears that apostasy, or the right to apostatise is not clearly provided for in the provisions. Probably it is a mere assumption derived from the generality of the title to art 11 or perhaps it is an inference from the right to 'profess' a religion under art 11(1). Thus, it seems that to include the right to apostatise as part of the right to freedom of religion under art 11 is a mere matter of interpretation to the provision. Perhaps it may be suggested that should apostasy is guaranteed by the Constitution, it may be necessary to have a clear provision in art 11 on the right to change religion as clearly provided for under art 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right 1948 ('UDHR'). In respect of the interpretation to the word 'profess' under art 11(1), Suryadi Halim Omar J in pronounced that apostasy is not a profession of religion and

thus should not be considered as part or the right to 'profess' a religion under art 11(1).[9]

Suggestion to extent the meaning of the words 'profess' and 'practise' under art 11(1) to include the right to apostatise was rejected by the court in the case. The extension, according to the court, 'would stretch the scope of art 11(1) to ridiculous heights, and rebel against the canon of construction'. Thus, may be said as a case which established that art 11 does not include the right to 'change religion' under the right to freedom of religion as exiting a religion is 'certainly not a religion'. In similar vein, Bari pointed out that 'freedom of religion' does not connote 'freedom from religion'.

 

Apart from that, besides the conflicts due to convert out cases, we also facing the conflict due to conversion to Islam with regard to the status of marriage because there are 2 laws which govern this matter. Firstly is section 51(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage And Divorce) Act 1976 [Act 164] (LRA) for non-Muslim and secondly is Islamic Family Law Act/Enactments. In Federal Territory, it is provided in section 46(2) of the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 [Act 303] (IFLA) for Muslim.

 

In a Parliametary debate on section 51(1) of the LRA, it was clear that the intention of this section is to provide relief to the non-Muslim wife in case the husband converts to Islam whilst the wife does not, the wife has the option to convert herself if she wishes. This section also gives her the right to apply for a divorce. If she does not petition for a divorce under the law, she remains to be a wife as she is not technically divorced.[10]

 

Muslim delegates argued that section 51(1) of the LRA causes humiliation to the convert spouse as it does not provide room for the convert spouse to dissolve the marriage. However, in the full context of section 51 of the LRA, it clearly states that the section aims to take care of the welfare of the child and wife. It seems that the welfare of the non convert spouse was the main concern and the legislators put aside the fact that the convert party may also be a wife. Indeed this creates bias against the convert spouse as the husband’s right to petition for a divorce is deprived.

 

Although we have inserted in our Act, a provision to dissolve the non-Muslim marriage by syariah court as specified in section 46(2) of the IFLA, but the Syariah Court has no jurisdiction over the non-Muslim marriage. The Federal Constitution Item 1, List II, Schedule Ninth of the Federal Constitution clearly states that the Islamic laws enacted by virtue of this Schedule shall only has the jurisdiction over persons professing the religion of Islam.

In the case of Pedley V Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang & Anor [11], the plaintiff, a Roman Catholic, had married a Roman Catholic lady according to Catholic rites on 12 February 1966. On 12 January 1987, the wife embraced the religion of Islam without the plaintiffs knowledge and assumes a Muslim name. On 10 April 1987, the Chief Kadi of Penang wrote to the plaintiff to the effect that his wife has embraced Islam and therefore he was advised also to follow her and embrace Islam within 90 days. The letter stated that if he not do so, the relationship between him and his wife as husband and wife would be terminated according to Islamic Law. The husband applied for a declaration that the conversion of his wife had not determined the marriage.

In tis case, the learned judge of the High Court held that the assertion of the Chief Kadi did not and will not affect the plaintiff’s legal position in the eyes of his own personal laws and civil laws of the country. Under the civil law, a non-Muslim marriage is not dissolved upon one of the parties converting to Islam. It only provides a ground for the other party, who has not so converted, to petition of divorce.

The decision in this case, is similar with the case of Natalie Abeysundere and Another as mention in the Article. The principle used is similar whereby the civil marriage will not be dissolved when one of the spouse convert into Islam.

 

An overview of the treatment of shariah law on apostasy

 

The person who apostate shall be punished with severe punishment because belief is the basic foundation of the identity, pivot, and spirit of life. That is why it does not allow anyone to harm this identity. Hence, proclaiming apostasy is considered the most flagrant crime in the eyes of Islam as it poses a danger to the identity of the Muslim community and its moral being. In other words, it jeopardizes the first five main objectives of the Shariah, which Islam with its moral and legislative systems seeks to preserve - religion, life, offspring, the intellect, and property. Religion occupies the very first place here as believers may sacrifice themselves, their country, and their wealth for the sake of their religion.

However, Almighty Allah does not accept that religion be taken lightly: a person joining it one day and forsaking it another day, in the like manner of the group of Jews about whom the Qur'an says, [A section of the People of the Book say: believe in the morning what is revealed to the believers, but reject it at the end of the day; perchance they may (themselves) turn back.][12]

The death penalty with regard to apostasy is to be applied only to those who proclaim their apostasy and call for others to do the same. Islam lays down this severe punishment in order to protect its unity and the identity of its community. Every community in this world has basic foundations that are to be kept inviolable, such as identity, loyalty, and allegiance. Accordingly, no community accepts that a member thereof changes its identity or turns his or her loyalty to its enemies. They consider betrayal of one's country a serious crime, and no one has ever called for giving people a right to change their loyalty from a country to another whenever they like.[13]

Apostasy is not only an intellectual situation whose handling is confined to discussing the principle of freedom of belief; it also involves a change of loyalty and identity. People who apostatize from Islam give up their loyalty to the Muslim nation and pay allegiance, heart and soul, to its enemies. This is denoted in the agreed-upon hadith that clarifies the kinds of people whose blood is lawful to shed and describes among those people the apostate, by saying, "Or someone who abandons his religion and the Muslim community" (Ibn Mas`ud).

The phrase, "And the Muslim community," is part of the description of an apostate; this entails that every apostate from Islam by implication abandons the Muslim community.

In the context of major and minor apostasy, Ibn Taymiyah mentioned that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) accepted the repentance of a group of apostates, and he ordered that another group of apostates, who had committed other harmful acts to Islam and the Muslims, be killed.

For instance, on the day of the conquest (fath) of Makkah, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) ordered that Maqis ibn Subabah be killed, as he had not only apostatized from Islam but also insulted and killed a Muslim person. He (peace and blessings be upon him) also ordered that Ibn Abi Sarh be killed, as he had apostatized from Islam and also sought to spread falsehood and slander.

In this respect, Ibn Taymiyah differentiated between two kinds of apostasy, an apostasy which does not cause harm to the Muslim society and an apostasy in which apostates wage war against Allah and His Messenger and spread mischief in the land. The repentance of the apostates in the first kind is accepted; while in the second kind, it is not if it occurs after the apostates have fallen into the power of the Muslim authority.[14]

`Abdur-Raziq, Al-Baihaqi, and Ibn Hazm reported that Anas returned from a mission for jihad and went to `Umar, who asked him, "What has been done with the six people from (the tribe) of Bakr ibn Wa'il who have apostatized from Islam?" Anas said, "O Commander of the Believers, they are people who turned apostate and joined the polytheists, and thus they were killed in the battle." `Umar commented, "We belong to Allah and to Him we will return." Anas wondered, "Had their penalty been but death?" `Umar replied, "Yes. I would have asked them to return to Islam, and had they refused, I would have imprisoned them."[15]

This attitude of `Umar was also held by Ibrahim An-Nakh`I, and Ath-Thawri, who said, "This is the viewpoint that we follow."[16] Ath-Thawri also said, "The punishment of the apostate is to be deferred so long as there is a hope that he may return to Islam."[17]

In the opinion of Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, as the scholars have differentiated between major and minor innovations in religion and between mere innovators and those who spread and call for their innovations in religion, we can also differentiate between major and minor apostasy, and between apostates who do not wage war against Islam and Muslims and those who proclaim their apostasy and call for it.

Major apostasy, which the apostate proclaims and openly calls for in speech or writing, is to be, with all the more reason, severely punished by the death penalty, according to the majority of scholars and the apparent meaning of the Prophet's hadiths. Otherwise, An-Nakh`i and Ath-Thawri's view which was built on `Umar's attitude may be followed.[18]

Apostates who call for apostasy from Islam have not only become disbelievers in Islam but have also become enemies of Islam and the Muslim nation. They, by doing so, fall under the category of those who wage war against Almighty Allah and His Messenger and spread mischief in the land.

According to Ibn Taymiyah, waging war against something may be done by already attacking it or by speaking against it. The latter may be far more dangerous than the former with regard to religions. So is also the case with spreading mischief: it may be through causing physical damage or through causing moral harm, and the latter is, likewise, far more hazardous than the former with regard to religions. This proves how much more harmful it is to wage war against Allah and His Messenger by speaking against them and seeking to spread mischief in the land.[19]

In Arab culture, we say that the pen is mightier than the tongue. Writing about something may be far more effective than merely speaking about it, especially in this day and age, as writings can be widely published.

On another hand, the apostate is deprived of its love, loyalty, and cooperation according to Almighty Allah's words, [And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them][20]. This far exceeds the punishment of execution in the view of the people of common sense.

 

Apart from sanction as mention above in accordance with Hukum Syarak, the state also regulates a law which provides a sanction of convert out cases. Muslims who renounced from Islam are subject to certain restrictions which include imprisonment, fine, whipping, or mandatory detention. Such restrictions have brought into debate, whether those punishments and detention are considered as infringements to the right of freedom of religion stipulated under fundamental liberty, which is guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.

 

So that, in discussing the law pertaining to apostasy, in fact there are at least five states in Malaysia that have incorporated the punishment for apostasy either in the Islamic Criminal Law Enactments or the Administration of Islamic Law Enactments. These provisions could be identified in the states of:

(a)       Pahang

 

In a decisive provision on apostasy, Pahang has made apostasy an offence in

its Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom Enactment of

1982 (Amended 1989). Section 185 provides “Any Muslim who states that he has ceased to be a Muslim, whether orally, in writing or in any other manner whatsoever, with any intent whatsoever, commits an offence, and on conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both and to whipping of not more that six strokes”.

 

(b)     Perak

The State of Perak has also made apostasy as an offence in its Islamic Criminal Law. Section 13 of the Perak Islamic Criminal Law Enactment of 1992 provides “Any Muslim who by his word or conduct whatsoever intentionally claims to cease to profess the religion of Islam or declares himself to be non-Muslim, shall be considered as insulting the religion of Islam, and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both”. Section 13 of the Perak Islamic Criminal Law Enactment of 1992 is merely a blasphemy. However, since there is no distinction made between blasphemy and apostasy, section 13 has been regarded as an offence of apostasy.[21]

 

 

 

 

(c)     Melaka

Like Pahang and Perak, Melaka has also incorporated the punishment of apostasy in its enactment. Section 209 (1) of the Melaka Administration of Islamic Law Enactment of 1986 provides a provision on insulting the religion of

Islam as an offence. Any Muslim convicted of this offence shall on conviction be

liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both. Under section 209 (2), the Enactment reiterates that a Muslim who declares himself to be out of the religion of Islam, shall also be regarded as insulting the religion of Islam, and upon conviction is subject to a fine and imprisonment as provided under clause (1).

 

(d)     Sabah

Unlike Sarawak, Sabah is the only Borneo state that declares apostasy as an offence under its Islamic Criminal Law Enactment of 1995. Section 55 (1) states “whoever by words spoken or written or by visible representation or in any other

manner which insults or brings into contempt or ridicule the religion of Islam or the tenets of any lawful school or any lawfully appointed religious officer, religious teacher, Imam, any lawfully issued fatwa by the Majlis or the Mufti under the provisions of any law or this Enactment shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both”. Section 55 (2) reiterates “ A Muslim who claims that he is not a Muslim shall be guilty of an offence under subsection (1) and shall, on conviction, be liable to the punishment thereof provided”.

 

(e)     Terengganu

It seems that Terengganu also follows the same step in introducing punishment for apostasy. Section 29 of the Terengganu Administration of Islamic Law Enactment of 1996 provides “Any Muslim who attempts to renounce the religion of Islam or declares himself to be non-Muslim, shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both”.

 

Apart from provisions of punishment for apostasy, there are also some states that provide detention for Muslims who intend to renounce Islam. This is because the respective state enactments require the persons to be rehabilitated and educated for the purpose of repentance. The general approach taken by states like Melaka is that, if a Muslim admits that he has left the religion of Islam or declares himself a non-Muslim, and the Court is satisfied that he has indeed done something that can be interpreted as an attempt to change his religion, the court should order him to be detained at the Islamic rehabilitation centre for a period not exceeding six months. During the period of rehabilitation, he will be required to undergo a course of education and asked to repent.[22] During this period also, the officer in charge is required to send a weekly progress report to the court.[23] If the detainee repents and the court is satisfied about the repentance, he will then be released.[24] Other states like Kelantan and Sabah appear to provide the same provisions except that the period of detention has been increased to up to 36 month.[25]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Part One: Conversion and Human Right in the Malaysian Context

 

The right to religious freedom in Malaysia is provided for under art 11 of the Federal Constitution. It is a provision under Part II of the Federal Constitution, which contains provisions on fundamental liberties. The title to art 11 is 'Freedom of Religion', which seems to cover various aspects of religious freedom, including those prescribed under international documents. However, there is restriction on the freedom. If there is no restriction imposed of course it will create chaotic situation because all the religions may do whatever their want includes propagate their religion without any limitation.

 

However, according to Abdul Aziz Bari, given the constitutional perspective on the issue, it is not a complicated issue. As mentioned earlier, the second limb of clause (1) to art. 3 may be said as providing for a formula on freedom of religion. Article 11(1) of the Federal Constitution is the most important provision on freedom of religion in Malaysia. It provides for the content and the scope of freedom of religion in Malaysia. Article 11(1) speaks on the right of individuals to profess, practise and propagate the religion. The right to propagate the religion however, may be restricted by state law by virtue of Article 11(4).

 

Article 11 (4) provides for the restriction of the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief to Muslims. The rationale is to protect Muslims from being influenced by other religions and to maintain social stability.[26] By virtue of Article 11(4)[27], ten State Legislatures have enacted the laws to control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam. The states are Terengganu[28], Kelantan[29], Kedah[30], Malacca[31], Perak[32], Selangor[33], Pahang[34], Negeri Sembilan[35], Johor[36] and Perlis[37].

Although ten states have make these law come into effect, but until now, only the state of Pahang has enforce this enactment in case, PP v Krishnan a/l Muthu[38]. In this case the complainant, Maziah Jusoh was in love with the accused, a married man, for seven years. As the complainant did not have a place to stay, she asked permission from the accused and his wife to live with them. The accused and the complainant had a series of arguments which resulted in physical fights. There was an instance the accused issued threats against the complainant to leave Islam and embrace Hinduism. The complainant was also asked to make an oath at the Hindu temple. Two charges were filed against the accused in the Magistrate’s Court. The accused was convicted on the charge under section 325 of the Panel Code and imposed with fine of RM 2,000. Besides that, the accused also convicted on the charge under section 4(2)(i) of the Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religion (Pahang) Enactment 1989 and imposed with fine of RM 1,500 and imprisonment for a period of 20 days.

 

Apart from Article 11(4), the right to choose religion also restricted by the virtue of article 12(4).[39] This Article clearly restrict the right of freedom of religion over the child. This Article also incontravene with the Article 14 of CRC[40] as stated earlier. The religion of a person under the age of 18 will be determined by the parent or guardian.

In the case of Re Susie Teoh or Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi Pasir Mas & Anor[41], I am in favour of the judgement made by the High Court, Abdul Malek J (as he then was). The approach take by the judge about the age of majority to ensure the capability of the children to choose her religion is in line with Hukum Syarak. As said by the judge the age of puberty is determined by her having menstruation rather than a specified age.

 

State law and jurisdictional issue

In the Administration of Islamic Law Act/Enactments, there is a provision about the procedure to convert Islam. But there is no provision about the matter of convert out of Islam. However since we have inserted a provision in a state enactment about the power of the Syariah High Court in its civil jurisdiction to make a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim or to make a declaration that a deceased person was a Muslim or otherwise at the time of his death, indirectly could be interpreted that such act is allowable, anly the procedural aspect was left to judge to decide except Negeri Sembilan, the only state which provides the proper procedure.

 

I also agree with the writer, that there is no difference made in interpretation of Islam to differentiate between the Muslim by birth or Muslim by conversion. In Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 [Act 505], section 2 states as follows:

“Muslim” means—

(a)       a person who professes the religion of Islam;

(b)       a person either or both of whose parents were, at the time of the person’s birth, Muslims;

 (c)      a person whose upbringing was conducted on the basis that he was a Muslim;

(d)       a person who has converted to Islam in accordance with the requirements of section 85;

(e)       a person who is commonly reputed to be a Muslim; or

(f)        a person who is shown to have stated, in circumstances in which he was bound by law to state the truth, that he was a Muslim, whether the statement be verbal or written;

 

By virtue of this provision all Muslims will be treated equally in the eyes of Islamic law enforceable in the states or Hukum Syarak either Muslim by birth or Muslim by conversion.

 

In my opinion these 2 kinds of Muslim, in terms of right to convert must be treated in different way. Being a Muslim by birth, they cannot simply convert out. The Muslim community is based on belief and faith. Belief is the basic foundation of its identity, pivot, and spirit of its life. That is why it does not allow anyone to harm this identity. Hence, proclaiming apostasy is considered the most flagrant crime in the eyes of Islam as it poses a danger to the identity of the Muslim community and its moral being. In other words, it jeopardizes the first five main objectives of the Shari`ah, which Islam with its moral and legislative systems seeks to preserve - religion, life, offspring, the intellect, and property. Religion occupies the very first place here as believers may sacrifice themselves, their country, and their wealth for the sake of their religion.

However for the Muslim by conversion, there should be a different method pertaining to convert out issues. In fact there are many cases of conversion due to marriage purposes not because of the voluntariness. Because of that situation, they easily to convert out especially if there is no more harmonious and happily marriage between the spouses.

Because of this factor, I think it is justified to have different method pertaining to convert out issue among Muslim either by birth or conversion.

In both cases given by the writer, it involves person who are Muslim by birth. In the case of Kamariah Ali v The Government of Kelantan, Malaysia & Ors[42], the judge make a conclusion that the law does not prohibit a Muslim to convert out of Islam. What is required is that a person must make a confirmation in the Syariah court to avoid confusion whether a person is still a Muslim or not. The same principle applied in the case of Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persektuan & Ors[43].

 

According to Aziz Bari, by virtue of Article 160(2)[44] of the Federal Constitution, Malays cannot renounce Islam. If Malay renounces Islam, he/she cannot be regarded as Malay since Malay and Islam are much attached. A Muslim who is an apostate could be considered as deviant, which consequently, allows some sort of punishment and rehabilitation. Detaining an apostate or a Muslim who intends to leave the Islamic faith for repentance and education purposes is meant to ‘persuade’ him to return to being Malay.[45] In Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor[46], the learned judge said that “a person as long as he/she is a Malay and by definition under Article 160 clause (2) a Malay, the said person cannot renounce his/her religion at all. A Malay under Article 160 (2) remains in the Islamic faith until his or her dying days.” The Court held that the appellant must first get the declaration from the Shari’ah Court and the regulation imposed by the National Registration Department on that matter was constitutional. This was affirmed by the Federal Court.[47]

 

Based on the judgement on the cases above show that most apostasy cases mainly do not suggest that Muslims are prohibited from renouncing Islam as long as they follow the procedural requirement as imposed by state law or any order made by the judge which is in accordance with Hukum Syarak (if there is no provision about the procedure to convert out). The learned judges also had ruled that the Shari’ah Courts were the competent courts and the right forums to adjudicate the cases when matters concerning Islamic law arise. Until the Shari’a Courts decide the status of the religion of a Muslim, he is deemed a Muslim and all Islamic rules shall applicable upon him.[48] It is very suitable and relevant with the provision of subsection 74(2) as stated-

 

“74. (2) For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a Muslim shall at all times be acknowledged and treated as a Muslim unless a declaration has been made by a Syariah Court that he is no longer a Muslim.[49]

 

Procedural requirement

It is true that there is no specific legislation governing the procedure to apostate. So far, the detail procedure with regard to the apostasy is provided in Negeri Sembilan through their Administration of the religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003. Because of that reason, the judge has to used their knowledge in Hukum Syarak to handle the convert out cases. Furthermore we have the provision in our Act/Enactments which stated that, “in the event of a lacuna or in the absence of any matter not expressly provided for by the Act or Enactment, the court shall apply Hukum Syarak.”.

            Based on the case given, we know that there are a lot of approaches taken by the court to decide the jurisdiction of court to try the convert out cases. In the case of Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (Perkim) Kedah & Anor[50]. In this case the court used the concept of inherent jurisdiction in the absent of written law. Wan Adnan Ismail J said that according to the fatwa, a Muslim who renounced the Islamic faith continues to remain in Islam until a Syariah Court makes a declaration that he has become an apostate.

With regard to this matter, I think there is no more problem arise since most of the state enactment has inserted in their law the power of the Syariah High Court in its civil jurisdiction to make a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim or to make a declaration that a deceased person was a Muslim or otherwise at the time of his death. However for the state which did not have that express jurisdiction, the concept of inherent jurisdiction maybe applied to decide the case as decided in the Soon Singh case.

 

In the case of Dalip Kaur[51], the plaintiff was a non-Muslim. In this case, the Supreme Court accepted the judgement of the High Court Judge (the writer) declaring that the deceased died as a Muslim. Mohamed Yusof HMA also stated that the issue of apostacy required specification in Islamic law and a suitable forum to do such decision is the Syariah court. Justice Mohamed Yusof has also stated that the court which is suitable to hear this matter is the Syariah court. So by this judgement, impliedly we might say that the Syariah court has the jurisdiction to declare religious status of a person, even though the applicant is not a Muslim. 

Federal Court in the case of Kamariah bte Ali[52] remind us not to use the literal approach towards the jurisdiction of Syariah court. The most important thing is to ensure the Syariah court to uphold justice based on the relevant law. The decision of the Syariah court by considering the evidence “bayyinah” of the dead heirs which is non Muslim shows the capability of the Syariah court to give justice to all person including non Muslim.

            Besides that, the cases that the writer put in this Article also, draw the same principle whereby in determining the status of religion of a person whether they are still a Muslim or not, the jurisdiction is on the hand of Syariah court. I agree with the judgement made by the court by giving the jurisdiction to the Syariah court because the issue of apostacy required specification in Islamic law and a suitable forum to do such decision is only the Syariah court as decided in the case of Dalip Kaur. However by having the provision of the jurisdiction only is not comprehensive if there is no procedure regulated for the purpose of implementation. So that, the state legislature have to provide certain procedure in their Act/Enactments as a guideline to the syarie judge in handling the postasy cases.

 

Part Two: Freedom Of Religion And The Right To Convert: The Practice In Indonesia

The background

                Islam had stepped on the land of nusantara (the then Malaysian-Indonesian archipelago as it was known) as early as first century of Hijriyah. However, the more established report said that Islam came and flourished in Nusantara on the first half of twelth century. It was so obvious in that era that Islamic kingdom emerged in Pasai, Sumatera. This fact was witnessed and written by Muslim scholar cum traveler Ibnu Batutah in 1345. From that time on, Islamic norms and laws emerged and were being implemented in Islamic kingdoms in Sumatera, Java, Banjar, Mataram as well as Banten

The historical and social phenomenon was recognized by the prominent Dutch legal scholar L.W. Christian van den Berg (1845-1927), who subsequently pronounced his celebrated theory of “receptie in complexu”. This theory believes that the law applicable to Indonesian people at that time was reffered to the religion they embraced. Meaning to say, for the Indonesian Muslim society in the period of Islamic Kingdoms, they already had Islamic law took place being implemented and enforced.

However, the arrival of Dutch colonials into the Indonesian land in the sixteenth century started with the commercial and trade mission, sees the influence of Islamic laws in Indonesia being slowly diminished  and eliminated. This was deemed important strategy for the Dutch to strenghthen their power in the country, i.e by first weakening main pillars of society.

Cornelis Van Volenhoven, and supported by orientalist Prof. Snouck Hurgronje, who contributed significantly in reengineering the legal system in Indonesia.They promulgated the so-called theory of “receptie” that limited the reception and application of Islamic law in Indonesia. The theory said that Islamic law in Indonesia  was applicable on so far it has been adopted as a customary law (adapt) in one particular territory.

Not surprisingly, this theory was formalized by the Dutch government and thus incorporated under the Dutch colonial constitution insdische Staatsregeling Article 134:2, and as the result, Islamic law has been put in the ‘prison’. This discovery of adapt law principle was destruction to the legal system that lived in  the Indonesian society at that time. Not only this theory limited the scope of Islamic law in Indonesia, but also it restricts the application, if any, to specific custom and region.

The 1945 Constitution

Islam has regained significant position in the independent Indonesia. However this improvement had to undergo a long and uphill road to emerge. This is because not every Muslim understood Islam as the way of life for them. This situation is undoubtedly due to low level of Muslim education as well as the impact of Dutch colonization.

According to Prof Huzairin noted; “mere education factor is not sufficient to ensure place for Islam and Islamic law in the new Indonesia. Not less important than that, regulatory and legislative approaches are a must. He lamented  that the implementation of Islamic law would be subject to the authority since law is associated with binding force. This notion conforms to the positivist school  of law that considers authority as an essential instrument in the law. It is the authority  that makes the law enacted and implemented through its binding force and punishment. In this respect, it is very important for Islamic law to have a constitutional basis in Indonesian legal system so as to ensure basis for further legislation”

It is submitted that the Indonesian 1945 constitution had brought greatest significance  in liberating Islam from Dutch ‘imprisonment’ through its provisions favorable to Islam. Different from several Muslim countries in the world those declares Islam as the religion of the country, Indonesia’s constitution does not specifically mention Islam as the religion of states.  However, it has put very significant place for the religion to grow in the heart of the people and the state alike.

This significance was first derived from Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution whereby it states that the state shall be based on the belief of oneness of the God, and that the state shall guarantee freedom of all the citizens to embrace religion and practice it accordingly. Hartono Mardjono, elaborated that the article indicates three important points:

(i)        State cannot enact laws or set policies that are in confrontation  with the principle of belief in one supreme God;

(ii)       State is mandate to enact laws and set up policies that will serve requirements of the faith principle on the belief in one supreme God; and

(iii)      State is bound to enact laws to prevent and penalize  those who undermine the religious norms asnd teachings.

Apart from this provision on constitutional guarantee to freedom of religion and practice, the gist of Indonesian constitution as promulgated in its preamble clearly mentions this belief in one supreme God as the basics principles of Indonesia, known as Pancasila. The words mention that Indonesia  shall be based on (inter alia) the principle of belief in one supreme God.

Liberalism Theory and Apostasy

The implementation of Shariah law always being a controversial issue in Indonesia. Aceh remained the only province within the country in which the central Government specifically authorized Shariah. The struggle to implement the law which is in line with the Hukum Syarak could be seen in several situation. As an example while Indonesian intend to table the draft of antipornography bill in Parliament. The draft bill sparked a heated national debate and led to large demonstrations (both for and against). Opponents of the bill said that it was an attempt by proponents of Shariah law to implement Shariah through the "back door."

            The situation which was happen above shows that it is not easy to introduce Shariah law in Indonesia. Because of that reason also, I think it is difficult for the government of Indonesia to have codified law about murtad and make it as an offence. If that law want to be implemented, it will be a controversial issue since they might think that it is incontravene with the freedom of the religion.

Besides that, the concept which was brought by Prof Bushtanul Arifin as mention in this Article, similar with the situation in Malaysia whereby in Malaysia we have the interpretation of Malay in Article 160 of federal Constitution which provides about the relation between Malay and professing the religion of Islam. If we apply the opinion of Prof Bushtanul Arifin in Malaysia, it means that conversion out of Islam is not acceptable in Malaysia community.

The Law After HAM (Hak Asasi Manusia) 1999-2000

The inclusion of HAM in the 1945 Constitution imposes a duty on every individual in Indonesia to respect human rights. Because of that reason, many activists of human rights put an effort to maintain the right of freedom of religion in Indonesia.

As an example, Indonesia’s Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) urge the government to reject any form of interference by the country/government on religious freedom or belief, allow everyone or every group the freedom to choose their religion or belief because any form of interference – without indication of a criminal act – is equal to disrespecting and not protecting that freedom.

Interference or intervention means a violation has been committed by the country/government because religious freedom or belief include the fundamental freedom in itself as non-derogable rights, therefore the banning of Ahmadiyah can be categorised as a gross violation of human rights. Firstly, it goes against the obligation to respect. Secondly, it violates the obligation to protect. Thirdly, with the ban, the next step is that the country/government has indeed committed a violation (of these obligations).

Interfaith marriage

            In discussing about the interfaith marriage, I think it happens because the position of Islam is not placed like in Malaysia. In Malaysia we recognized Islam as the religion of Federation by virtue of article 3 of the Federal Constitution. By having this Article, it will protect any action that contravene with Hukum Syarak such as interfaith marriage from being happen.

In Indonesia since there is no special status to religion of Islam, Indonesia take a International instrument as a basic and guidance to all practice in Indonesia. That's why they recognized interfaith marriage since it is in line with the human rights.

The human right activist will put an effort to go against any Islamic authority in order to protect their right in accordance with the concept of human right. As an example, in late July 2005 MUI issued a fatwa denouncing pluralism, secularism, and liberal forms of Islam, along with interfaith marriage and interfaith prayer. While the fatwa generated heated debates and served as a factor behind subsequent militant actions, it produced no perceptible substantive impact on the law.

Finding and Conclusion Comparative Overview

            Based on the above discussion we might conclude that, in fact there is no much different between Federal Constitution of Malaysia and 1945 Constitution in Indonesia. With regard to conversion out of Islam, both constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, but they silent the right to convert out.

            Besides that, in Malaysia we associate Malay with Muslim, similar like Javanese whereby they also associated with Muslim. By virtue of this provision, shows that being a Malay or Javanese, they have no right to convert out.

            In Indonesia, all the laws enacted always influence by an International instrument such as United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I think, this situation happen because in 1945 constitution they fail to give the special status towards Islam.

            The situation is different in Malaysia, whereby we recognize Islam as the religion of the Federation by virtue of article 3 of the constitution. In Islamic matters we left it to the state. So, the state legislature in legislating any laws will always ensure that it is in line with Hukum Syarak in order to protect Islam as the religion of Federation.

Legality of the State Law and Jurisdiction of the Court

The jurisdiction to determine the status of religion of a person whether he/she is still a Muslim or not should be given to the Syariah court. Syariah court is the proper forum to determine a Muslims' religious status. By implication, it can be said that, in deciding whether a Muslim can change his religion or not, it is left to the Syariah courts to decide, in which, Islamic law will surely be applied.

Besides that, most of the state enactment has inserted in their law the power of the Syariah High Court in its civil jurisdiction to make a declaration that a person is no longer a Muslim or to make a declaration that a deceased person was a Muslim or otherwise at the time of his death. However for the state which did not have that express jurisdiction, the concept of inherent jurisdiction maybe applied to decide the case as decided in the Soon Singh case.

 

The Nature of Murtad in the Malaysia Scenario and Appropriate Sanction

 

            I agree with the category of Murtad in Malaysia as mention by the writer. Although we know that there is no different made towards the interpretation of Muslim in the Act/Enactments, but we know that there are person who being a Muslim by birth, conversion or born Muslim either Malay or non-Malay who associate or mingle in a non Muslim environment and become confused about their Muslim identity.

            With regard to the sanction, I think counselling or giving the proper guidance is the best solution. What we want from them is to coming back to Islam. We do not want to create more hatred towards Islam by imposing the punishment of whipping or imprisonment. The Islamic authority play an important role to protect the aqidah of a Muslim from continuously being influenced by the religion other than Islamic religion.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1.         Abdul Aziz Bari, “Murtad Dalam Konteks Kebebasan Beragama di Malaysia”, Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 3 (1999)

2.         Current Law Journal

3.         Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,  Apostasy: Major and Minor

4.         Malayan Law Journal

5.         Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Restrictions in Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: A Conceptual Analysis with Special Reference to the Law of Apostasy, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 2 2007 Article , The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

6.         Shamrahayu A Aziz Lecturer, Apostasy And Religious Freedom: A Response To Thio Li-Ann

7.         Shamrahayu A. Aziz, Muslims' Right To Freedom Of Religion In Malaysia: Piercing Through The Confusion And Contradiction



[1] Shamrahayu A Aziz Lecturer, Apostasy And Religious Freedom: A Response To Thio Li-Ann, p.14-15

 

[2] Shamrahayu A Aziz, Apostasy And Religious Freedom: A Response To Thio Li-Ann, p.14-15

[3] Ibid.

[4] ibid

[5] Daud bin Mamat & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam & Anor[2001] 2 MLJ 390. See the commentary of this case in Abdul Aziz Bari, 'The Jurisdiction of Syariah Courts and the Right to Freedom of Religion under the

Federal Constitution: A Case Note on Daud Mamat & Ors' (2001) 9 IIUMLJ 87

[6] Kamariah bte Ali dan Lain-lain v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan, Malaysia dan Satu lagi [2002] 3 MLJ 657.

[7] Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 119. See the commentaries of this case in Abdul Aziz Bari, 'The Relationship between the Position of Islam in the Cosntitution and the Scope of Religious Freedom; Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor' (2004) 12 IIUMLJ 145 and in Thio Li-ann 'Apostasy and Religious Freedom: Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation' [2006] 2 MLJ i.

[8] Shamrahayu A. Aziz, Muslims' Right To Freedom Of Religion In Malaysia: Piercing Through The Confusion And Contradictions, P.22

[9] Shamrahayu A Aziz, Apostasy And Religious Freedom: A Response To Thio Li-Ann, P.12

[10]  Parliametary Debate, Vol.1, Section Ii, 4th November 1975, P.6495-6503

[11] [1990] 2 MLJ 307

[12] (Aal `Imran 3:72)

 

[13] Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,  Apostasy: Major and Minor

 

[14] Reported by `Abdur-Raziq in his Musannaf, vol. 10, p. 168. saying no. 18710.

[15] Ibn Taymiyah, As-Sarim Al-Maslul, p. 368 (As-Sa`adah ed, verified by Muhey Ad-Din `Abdul-Hamid).

[16] Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,  Apostasy: Major and Minor

[17] `Abdur-Raziq, Al-Musanaf, vol. 10, saying no. 18697.

[18] Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Apostasy: Major and Minor

[19] Ibn Taimiyah, As-Sarim Al-Maslul, p. 321.

[20] (Al-Ma'idah 5:51)

[21] Section 13 of the Perak Islamic Criminal Law Enactment of 1992 is merely a blasphemy.

However, since there is no distinction made between blasphemy and apostasy, section 13 has been

regarded as an offence of apostasy.

[22] Section 66 (1) of the Melaka Shari’a Offences Enactment of 1991.

[23] Section 66 (2) (a) and (b) of the Melaka Shari’a Offences Enactment of 1991.

[24] Section 66 (3) of the Melaka Shari’a Offences Enactment of 1991.

[25] Section 102 (3) of the Council of Religion of Islam and Malay Custom Enactment of Kelantan, 1994; Section 63(1) of the Enactment of Islamic Criminal Law of Sabah, 1995.

[26] Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Restrictions in Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: A Conceptual Analysis with Special Reference to the Law of Apostasy, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 2 2007 Article , The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 page 1-2.

[27] 11. (4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.

[28] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactments 1980 (Enactment 1/1980).

[29] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactment 1981 (Enactment No 11/1981)

[30] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactment 1988 (Enactment No 11/1988)

[31] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions to Muslims Enactment 1988 (Enactment No 1/1988)

[32] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactment 1988 (Enactment No 10/1988)

[33] Non-Islamic Religion (Control of Propagations Among Muslims) Enactment 1988 (Enactment No 1/1988)

[34] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactment 1989 (Enactment No 5/1989)

[35] Control and Restriction (Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Among Muslims) Enactment 1991 (Enactment

[36] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Non-Islamic Religions Enactment 1991 (Enactment No 11/1991)

[37] Control and Restriction of the Propagation of Religious Doctrine and Beliefs which is Contrary to the Religion of Islam Enactment 2002 (Enactment No. 6/2002)

[39] “For the purpose of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.”.

[40] “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. “.

 

[41] [1990] 2MLJ 300

[42] [2002] 3CLJ 766

[43] [2007] CLJ JT(1)

[44] Article 160 defines ‘Malay’ as a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language and conforms to Malay customs.

[45] Abdul Aziz Bari, “Murtad Dalam Konteks Kebebasan Beragama di Malaysia”, Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 3 (1999) pp. 54-70.

[46] [2004] 2 MLJ 119.

[47] Ibid

[48] Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, Restrictions in Freedom of Religion in Malaysia: A Conceptual Analysis with Special Reference to the Law of Apostasy, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, Volume 4, Issue 2 2007 Article , The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007.

[49] Administration Of The Religion Of Islam (State Of Selangor) Enactment 2003

[50] (1999) 1 MLJ 489

[51] (1992) 1 MLJ 7

[52] (2002) 3 MLJ 657